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The Importance of the Prefiling Phase for Securities-
Fraud Litigation 
John M. Wunderlich* 
The pleading burden that governs securities-fraud litigation is 
significantly higher than those standards that govern traditional civil 
cases.  The heightened pleading burden applicable to securities cases 
has transformed the motion to dismiss into something like summary 
judgment.  In fact, to contend with this heightened pleading burden, 
plaintiffs typically must spend more time in the prefiling phase 
gathering sufficient, reliable evidence of securities fraud.  
With almost two decades of litigation under the securities laws’ 
heightened pleading burden, empirical studies are revealing that 
certain kinds of evidence are more likely to defeat a motion to dismiss 
than others.  But dismissal statistics and cases are telling in another 
respect as well.  They reveal that some forms of corroboration (SEC 
proceedings, accounting restatements, bankruptcies) seem more likely 
to help stave off dismissal than others (insider trading, inferences from 
shared experience, and accounts from confidential witnesses).  This 
issue—the effective strategies for investigating and pleading securities-
fraud claims—is the subject of this year’s conference sponsored by 
Loyola University Chicago School of Law’s Institute for Investor 
Protection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* John M. Wunderlich is a litigator in the Chicago office of Kirkland & Ellis LLP, where he 
practices securities, antitrust, and complex litigation.  Additionally, John is the Institute Scholar 
for the Institute of Investor Protection at Loyola University Chicago School of Law.  I thank the 
participants of the Institute for Investor Protection’s 2013 Conference, in particular, Judge 
Rebecca Pallmeyer, Professors Charles W. Murdock, Marc I. Steinberg, and Wendy Gerwick 
Couture, and Marc I. Gross of Pomerantz Grossman Hufford Dahlstrom & Gross LLP.  
Additionally, I owe much to Dean Michael J. Kaufman of Loyola University Chicago School of 
Law, Yelena Shagall of Katten Muchin Rosenman, and the editors of the Loyola University 
Chicago Law Journal for their insightful comments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important questions in a securities-fraud case—
called by some the “main event”1—is how plausible is it that the 
 
1. Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, The Supreme Court’s Impact on Securities Class 
Actions: An Empirical Assessment of Tellabs 1–2 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Law & Econ. 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-016 and N.Y.U. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 09-34, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1434561 (“The PSLRA makes the motion to dismiss the main event in securities fraud class 
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plaintiffs’ allegations suggest fraud at the outset and not something 
else?  That main event is characterized by a heightened pleading burden, 
no access to formal discovery, and an increased probability of sanctions 
under Rule 11.  That main event has made the prefiling phase—the time 
when plaintiffs seek evidence to corroborate their allegations—much 
more significant. 
Whether the plaintiffs’ allegations plausibly suggest fraud largely 
depends on whether they have found sufficient, reliable corroborative 
evidence of their allegations in the prefiling phase.  This may sound 
intuitive as surely the more evidence to support a claim, the more reason 
it has to progress through the screening phases of litigation.  Empirical 
studies and case law have begun to confirm that plaintiffs who have 
gathered sufficient, reliable evidence to corroborate allegations of fraud 
in the prefiling phase are more likely to survive dismissal.  But, 
interestingly, dismissal statistics and case law also reveal that certain 
forms of corroboration—certain kinds of evidence—appear more likely 
to help stave off dismissal than others.  That is, empirical studies and 
case law have begun to clarify what kinds of evidence plaintiffs should 
focus on in a prefiling investigation.  This issue—the effective strategies 
for investigating and pleading securities-fraud claims—is the subject of 
this year’s conference sponsored by Loyola University Chicago School 
of Law’s Institute for Investor Protection. 
This Article is divided into two parts that track the argument above.  
The first Part contends that the securities laws have moved the motion 
to dismiss toward summary judgment, making plaintiffs more likely to 
survive a motion to dismiss if they have first gathered sufficient, 
reliable evidence to corroborate allegations of fraud in the prefiling 
phase.  The second Part shows that some forms of corroboration (strong 
forms) appear more likely to defeat a motion to dismiss than others 
(weak forms).  These strong forms of corroboration include Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) proceedings, accounting 
restatements, and a parallel bankruptcy.  The weaker forms include 
insider trading, inferences from shared experiences, and accounts from 
confidential witnesses. 
 
 
actions, effectively using the district courts as gatekeepers charged with screening out meritless 
class actions at an early stage, while allowing meritorious actions to proceed.”); A.C. Pritchard & 
Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical Study of Motions to Dismiss Under the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 4 (Univ. Mich. John M. Olin Center for Law & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 03-011, 2003), available at http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent. 
cgi?article=1018&context=law_econ_archive (characterizing the motion to dismiss as the “main 
event”). 
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I. THE SECURITIES LAWS ARE GOVERNED BY A PLEADING STANDARD
 SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER THAN THOSE STANDARDS GOVERNING 
TRADITIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION 
The focus on the prefiling phase is the result of the pleading 
standards and procedural rules that govern securities-fraud complaints.  
These rules create access barriers that are significantly higher than those 
that govern traditional civil cases. 
A. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Represent the Predominant 
Mechanism for Investors to Seek Recovery for Fraud 
The predominant vehicle through which private investors seek relief 
for fraud on the market is section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934.2  This law forbids securities fraud in violation of the rules set 
by the SEC.3  The SEC’s Rule 10b-5 prohibits fraud—by commission 
or omission—in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.4  
The predominance of this mechanism caused Chief Justice Rehnquist to 
famously dub the 10b-5 action as “a judicial oak which has grown from 
little more than a legislative acorn.”5 
But the judiciary has been careful not to make a federal case out of 
every instance of corporate negligence6 or breach of fiduciary duty 
where the conduct alleged is not manipulative or deceptive.7  Rather, 
the Supreme Court has settled that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are 
intent-based liability provisions.8  The level of intent required is called 
“scienter” in securities lingo, and it signifies an intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud.9  According to every federal court of appeals, 
 
2. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2012 YEAR IN REVIEW 6 
(2013), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/files/Publication/dd449114-231a-43c5-af94-
341bb14bc830/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0f96fd68-e318-41d2-b324-30cabf8c4d9d/ 
Cornerstone_Research_Securities_Class_Action_Filings_2012_YIR.pdf (finding that in 2012, 
approximately 85% of securities-fraud complaints were Rule 10b-5 claims); ELLEN M. RYAN & 
LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 
2012 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 11 (2013), available at http://www.cornerstone.com 
/files/upload/Cornerstone_Research_2012_Settlements.pdf (finding that between 1996 and 2012, 
there were 1306 securities-fraud settlements, and 997 of which involved only Rule 10b-5 claims). 
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012). 
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013); see also Facebook, Inc. v. Pac. Nw. Software, Inc., 640 F.3d 
1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011). 
5. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
6. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976). 
7. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478−79 (1977). 
8. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193–94 (holding that allegations of scienter are necessary in 
a private cause of action for damages under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
9. Id. at 193 n.12. 
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scienter encompasses some form of recklessness as well.10  
Recklessness is “a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely 
simple or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from 
the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of 
misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is 
so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.”11 
B. The Civil Rules Already Require Heightened Pleading for All Fraud 
Claims 
To craft an adequate securities-fraud complaint, plaintiffs must 
comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9, as well as the 
pleading requirements and other standards of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”).12 
Rule 8 is the baseline.  Its federal notice-pleading standard requires a 
complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”13  According to the Supreme Court, 
a complaint must plead sufficient facts to “raise a right to relief above 
the speculative level” and “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”14  Determining whether a complaint meets this standard requires 
that the court engage in a “context-specific” inquiry and “draw on its 
judicial experience and common sense.”15  Generally, “[a] claim has 
facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to 
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”16 
 
10. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007). 
11. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977) (internal 
quotations omitted).  Although the federal appellate courts have couched their recklessness 
standards differently, the application among the circuit courts of appeals tends to converge on 
whether there is an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care presenting a danger of 
misleading investors that is either known to the defendant or so obvious that the actor must have 
been aware of it.  Ann Morales Olazábal, Defining Recklessness: A Doctrinal Approach to 
Deterrence of Secondary Market Securities Fraud, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1415, 1424–25; Ann 
Morales Olazábal, The Search for “Middle Ground”: Towards a Harmonized Interpretation of 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s New Pleading Standard, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 
153, 162–64 (2001). 
12. See, e.g., FindWhat Investor Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(noting that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a claim brought under Rule 10b-5 must satisfy (1) 
the federal notice pleading requirements; (2) the special fraud pleading requirements found in 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), . . . and (3) the additional pleading requirements imposed 
by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995” (internal citation omitted)). 
13. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
14. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009). 
15. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 
16. Id. at 663. 
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But cases of fraud present unique concerns, concerns that the drafters 
of the Federal Rules accept as absent from other kinds of cases.  First, 
tarnishing someone’s reputation with an allegation of fraud is easy, so 
easy, in fact, that plaintiffs may be tempted to bring bogus claims of 
fraud and defendants may be pressured to settle these claims rather than 
have their reputations publicly sullied.17  Second, “fraud” is such a 
general category of misconduct that without particularized claims, the 
defendant may not have adequate notice of the real claim at issue, and 
the plaintiff may be able to defeat a motion to dismiss by generally 
alleging fraud and then proceeding to discovery to attempt to uncover 
whether fraud actually occurred.18 
So, to discourage plaintiffs from filing meritless claims and to expose 
to the public claims of fraud that have no basis, Rule 9(b) requires a 
securities-fraud plaintiff to “state with particularity the circumstances 
constituting [the fraud].”19  That is, investors have to plead the facts 
surrounding the fraud in advance: “(1) specify the statements that the 
plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state 
where and when the statements were made, and (4) explain why the 
statements were fraudulent.”20  But Rule 9(b) recognizes that our mind-
reading capabilities are non-existent, that actually describing a mental 
state with precision is a trying feat, and that to come close to actually 
doing so on paper would require a level of wordiness inconsistent with 
Rule 8’s calling for short and plain statements.21  Thus, as a pleading 
rule, plaintiffs may allege the defendant’s state of mind generally.22 
Even with Rule 9(b)’s exception for state of mind, Rule 9(b) is still a 
significant pleading burden, namely because there is no fraud by 
hindsight.23  As explained by the Ninth Circuit in In re GlenFed, Inc. 
Securities Litigation, there is no reason to assume that what is true at the 
moment of the discovery of the alleged fraud was also true at the time 
 
17. 5A CHARLES W. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 
1296 (3d ed. 2013). 
18. Id. 
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
20. See, e.g., Romach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 170 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted). 
21. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 17, § 1301. 
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s 
mind may be alleged generally.”); see also Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d 1246, 
1252 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating the rule does not require particularity in connection with the 
condition of mind), superseded by statute, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. 
L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
23. See, e.g., Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d Cir. 1993) (“A statement 
cannot be fraudulent if it did not affect an investment decision of the plaintiff.”); Denny v. 
Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978) (requiring falsity at the time reports are issued). 
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of the alleged misrepresentation.24  Indeed, between the time when a 
firm announces something to public investors and the time some 
sobering truth is revealed and the company’s stock price drops, any 
number of events could have occurred that explain the difference 
between an earlier, cheerier statement and a later, less-rosy picture.  
Between an alleged misstatement and a drop in stock price, there may 
be a general decline in the stock market, a specific decline in the market 
for the defendant-firm’s industry, a shift in consumer demand, a new 
competitor, a major lawsuit, an internal reevaluation of assets or 
recalculation of loan-loss reserves, etc.25 
The point is that the mere fact that an allegedly fraudulent statement 
and a later statement are different does not mean that the earlier 
statement was false.  Thus, even though plaintiffs may allege the 
defendant’s state of mind generally, to suggest any culpable state of 
mind at all, plaintiffs must explain why the public statements were false 
when made, which often (though not always) depends on a showing that 
internal company information was inconsistent with contemporaneous 
public statements.26 
It is important to emphasize that this common-law rule for pleading 
under Rule 9 developed in the shadow of plaintiffs’ access to such 
internal information through discovery.27  Plaintiffs had access to 
internal company information through the discovery provisions of the 
Federal Rules, and if they did not have the requisite internal information 
when they filed their complaint, they could revise and replead their 
 
24. 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), superseded by statute, Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 109 Stat. 737. 
25. Id.; see also Dura Pharm. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–43 (2005) (“When the 
purchaser subsequently resells such shares, even at a lower price, that lower price may reflect, not 
the earlier misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances, changed investor 
expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events, which taken 
separately or together account for some or all of that lower price.  (The same is true in respect to a 
claim that a share’s higher price is lower than it would otherwise have been—a claim we do not 
consider here.)  Other things being equal, the longer the time between purchase and sale, the more 
likely that this is so, i.e., the more likely that other factors caused the loss.”). 
26. See, e.g., In re GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1548; see also Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp Inc., 25 
F.3d 1124, 1129–30 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal of complaint as insufficient to support an 
inference of fraud when complaint did not demonstrate that defendant’s disclosures were 
inconsistent with current data when made); Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery 
Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ‘33 and ‘34 Act 
Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537, 547 (1998) (noting the Ninth Circuit’s statement that “Rule 
9(b) . . . require[s] plaintiffs to plead with particularity contemporaneous facts, conditions, or 
statements that tend[] to show the alleged misstatement when made” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
27. Sale, supra note 26, at 562. 
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allegations soon after.28 
C. Securities-Fraud Cases Require Heightened Pleading Above the 
Heightened Pleading Under Rule 9 
Despite the heightened pleading standard under Rule 9, Congress and 
the judiciary believed that the concerns that justify heightened pleading 
in the fraud context are amplified in the securities-fraud class-action 
context.  Congress and the judiciary feared that securities-fraud class-
action plaintiffs compared to traditional fraud plaintiffs are even more 
motivated to bring spurious claims and, in turn, defendants are even 
more motivated to settle because damages are exponentially greater.29 
In hearings to reform the securities-fraud class action, Congress 
listened to testimony that securities cases had become lawyerly led 
frivolous affairs in which counsel would file a suit on the hopes of an 
easy pay off.  And, in those cases, if the suit progressed to discovery, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys would take up the company’s time and the time of 
key management while they fished for viable fraud claims.30  So in 
1995, Congress set out to reform securities-fraud litigation by enacting a 
number of procedural barriers.  These procedural barriers were designed 
to reduce the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ role in securities cases, ensure that 
plaintiffs diligently investigated claims before filing them, and provide 
courts with tools to screen those securities cases that were clearly 
meritless. 
To achieve these ends, Congress demanded more specificity and 
particularity in pleading—more than what was required under Rule 
9(b).31  First, the PSLRA required that plaintiffs allege with 
particularity each statement alleged to have been misleading and why it 
was misleading.32 
Second, the PSLRA modified the rules for pleading on information 
 
28. Id. at 562–63. 
29. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685; H.R. 
REP. NO. 104-369, at 37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 736; see also 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975) (stating that “litigation under 
Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which 
accompanies litigation in general”). 
30. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4–5; H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 37. 
31. See, e.g., Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc. (Tellabs I), 437 F.3d 588, 594 (7th 
Cir. 2006) (“Unlike a run-of-the-mill complaint, which will survive a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim so long as it is possible to hypothesize a set of facts, consistent with the 
complaint, that would entitle the plaintiff to relief, . . . the PSLRA essentially returns the class of 
cases it covers to a very specific version of fact pleading—one that exceeds even the particularity 
requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).” (internal citation and quotation omitted)), 
vacated and remanded, 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(1)–(2) (2012). 
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and belief.  Normally, factual allegations may be based on information 
and belief, and a complaint containing these allegations is appropriate 
when the information is within the knowledge of the defendant, not the 
plaintiff, or the belief is based on factual information that makes the 
inference of culpability possible.33  The PSLRA required that if an 
allegation is made on information and belief, then the plaintiff must 
allege with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.34 
Third, the PSLRA required plaintiffs to allege with particularity the 
defendant’s state of mind.35  In the normal course, Rule 9(b) allows 
plaintiffs to allege the defendant’s mental state generally.36  Yet under 
the PSLRA, plaintiffs must allege the defendant’s mental state with 
particularity.37  The PSLRA requires plaintiffs to allege the “who, what, 
where, why, and when” surrounding the fraud and the defendant’s 
mental state.38 
Alleging facts from which a court must draw a strong inference of the 
defendant’s mental state is a significant break from Rule 9(b).  What 
does it even mean to allege a “strong inference” of what is in someone 
else’s head?  Well, an “inference” is a conclusion reached by 
considering other facts and deducing a logical conclusion from those 
facts.  So the question then is what “other” facts are considered and 
when does an inference become “strong”?  As framed by one court, the 
inquiry devolves into “the degree of imagination courts can use in 
divining whether a complaint creates a ‘strong inference.’”39  And one 
securities litigator has written that “[j]udges have enough latitude under 
the pleading standards to dismiss or not, in most cases.  The pivotal 
‘fact’ is . . . whether the judge feels the case is really a fraud case, or 
not.”40 
 
33. See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The Twombly 
plausibility standard, which applies to all civil actions, . . . does not prevent a plaintiff from 
pleading facts alleged upon information and belief where the facts are peculiarly within the 
possession and control of the defendant, . . . or where the belief is based on factual information 
that makes the inference of culpability plausible.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)). 
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(1)–(2). 
35. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2). 
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). 
38. See, e.g., Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 253 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(explaining the PSLRA’s particularity requirement); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 
(2d Cir. 1990) (similar). 
39. See, e.g., Tellabs I, 437 F.3d 588, 601 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated and remanded, 551 U.S. 
308 (2007). 
40. Douglas W. Greene, Falsity is Fundamental: The Case for Emphasizing Arguments 
Against Falsity, D&O DISCOURSE (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.dandodiscourse.com/2013/10/07/ 
falsity-is-fundamental-the-case-for-emphasizing-arguments-against-falsity/. 
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In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., the Supreme Court 
provided guidance on both questions—what “facts” are considered and 
when is an inference “strong.”  First, no longer would plaintiffs receive 
the benefit of the doubt on a motion to dismiss.  Rather, on a motion to 
dismiss, while the court must accept all factual allegations in the 
complaint as true, the court also must consider nonculpable or innocent 
explanations one could draw from those facts.41  Second, an inference is 
strong only when the culpable inference drawn from those facts is at 
least as likely as the non-culpable explanation.42 
There can be no question that this is a major change from notice-
pleading standards43 and that it has puzzled some judges.  Judge Posner 
raised this notion, remarking that for judges accustomed to notice 
pleading, the drawing of strong inferences from factual allegations is 
“mysterious”; even where Rule 9(b) requires plaintiffs to plead facts, 
courts must treat those facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the plaintiff.44 
 
41. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322–23; see also In re Guidant Corp. Sec. Litig., 536 F. Supp. 2d 913, 
932 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (stating that “the [Tellabs] line of cases makes clear [that] we must consider 
competing inferences arising from the facts as pled in order to determine whether [p]laintiffs have 
created the requisite ‘strong inference’ of scienter” (emphasis in original)). 
42. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322–23. 
43. Consider what Charles W. Wright and Arthur Miller have to say on the subject: 
A proposition that is at the heart of the application of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and 
one that is of universal acceptance, as evidenced by the myriad of illustrative cases 
cited in the note below—drawn from throughout the federal court system, including the 
Supreme Court—is that for purposes of the motion to dismiss, (1) the complaint is 
construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, (2) its allegations are taken as 
true, and (3) all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the pleading are drawn in 
favor of the pleader. 
5B CHARLES W. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1357 
(13th ed. 2013). 
44. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc. (Tellabs II), 513 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 
2008).  According to some, Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal may have 
heightened the pleading standard in traditional civil litigation to require this sort of PSLRA-
weighing process.  See, e.g., Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin, Twombly and Iqbal: The Introduction of a 
Heightened Pleading Standard, 27 TOURO L. REV. 233, 240 (2011) (“Judges now must draw 
inferences in favor of both sides.  This balancing test requires the court to draw inferences on the 
defense’s behalf, without the benefit of a defense pleading.  The process, overall, has created a 
new phenomenon: the motion to dismiss has become akin to summary judgment, while summary 
judgment has become akin to a trial.” (internal citations omitted)); Marc I. Steinberg & Diego E. 
Gomez-Cornejo, Blurring the Lines Between Pleading Doctrines: The Enhanced Rule 8(a)(2) 
Plausibility Standard Converges With the Heightened Pleading Standards Under Rule 9(b) and 
the PSLRA, 30 REV. LITIG. 1, 3 (2010) (“By enhancing the basic pleading standard applicable in 
every federal civil case, the Supreme Court has elevated the previously liberal Rule 8(a)(2) 
pleading standard to approach the heightened pleading standards predicated on allegations of 
fraud—the Rule 9(b) fraud pleading standard and the pleading standard for scienter in securities 
fraud actions under the PSLRA.  This evident convergence of pleading standards blurs the lines 
between pleading doctrines that were adopted to address different policy concerns, thus creating a 
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The effect of these pleading rules is that the motion to dismiss for 
securities-fraud cases is summary-judgment like.  For instance, the 
balancing act required to determine a “strong inference” may have 
caused judges to take a more liberal view of material properly subject to 
judicial notice in a securities-fraud case.  Professor Hilary Sale put it 
best: “Since the PSLRA . . . the practice of incorporating documents has 
expanded to include documents not signed or publicly filed by 
defendants.”45  Additionally, some judges have described the PSLRA’s 
pleading standard and the weighing of inferences as more akin to the 
inquiry on summary judgment than the motion-to-dismiss standard.46  
And some courts have even said that the standard for pleading scienter 
is higher than the standard for proving scienter at summary judgment.47 
And yet, the PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements are not the 
only changes that differentiate securities litigation from traditional civil 
cases.  Two other procedural changes amplify the importance of the 
prefiling phase for securities cases.  First, the plaintiffs must satisfy the 
PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements while discovery is 
 
federal civil litigation system that is unfair and incongruous.”); Suja A. Thomas, The New 
Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 15, 30 (2010) (“The second similarity in the motion to dismiss and summary 
judgment standards is that under both, while it appears that courts should view the facts in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, in assessing whether a claim is plausible, courts 
assess both the inferences favoring the moving party and the inferences favoring the nonmoving 
party.” (internal citations omitted)). 
45. Hilary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903, 945 n.163 (2002) 
(collecting cases). 
46. In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1556 (9th Cir. 1994) (Norris, J., dissenting) 
(“It is also true, however, that there are social costs associated with a rule of pleading that causes 
a proliferation of complaints that are chock full of allegations of detailed evidentiary matter.  Not 
only are such pleadings burdensome for defendants to deal with, they are burdensome for judges 
who are required to comb through the evidentiary matter pleaded and struggle with the inferences 
it does or does not support as though the evidence were presented in affidavit form as required by 
Rule 56 rather than merely alleged in a complaint.  This is a difficult and time-consuming process 
that judges must necessarily engage in at the summary judgment stage, but it is a wasteful use of 
judicial resources to require judges to engage in the same process at the pleading stage.”). 
47. See In re Novatel Wireless Sec. Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1017–18 (S.D. Cal. 2011) 
(“[A] private securities plaintiff proceeding under the PSLRA must plead, in great detail, facts 
that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless or conscious 
misconduct. . . . But at summary judgment, the standard is less stringent—the PSLRA 
requirement of pleading a ‘strong’ inference of scienter ‘puts securities fraud claims in the 
interesting posture of requiring plaintiffs to plead more than they must prove at trial, where a 
simple inference of scienter is sufficient to support a jury’s verdict.’ . . . The Ninth Circuit has 
confirmed that the PSLRA did not alter the substantive requirements for scienter under § 10(b) 
and that the standard on summary judgment or JMOL remains unaltered. . . . As long as a 
reasonable jury could conclude that the danger of misleading investors was either ‘known’ or ‘so 
obvious’ that defendants ‘must have been aware of it,’ a triable issue of fact exists.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
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automatically stayed.  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 
discovery proceeds despite any motion to dismiss.48  Although Rule 26 
allows a party to ask the court to stay discovery pending a dispositive 
motion, the court will stay discovery only if the moving party shows 
“good cause” for doing so.49  But Congress believed that discovery was 
employed abusively and that plaintiffs engaged in “fishing expeditions” 
to uncover evidence to sustain already-filed claims.50  With the PSLRA, 
Congress made automatic a stay of discovery pending any motion to 
dismiss.51  The discovery stay compounds the effect of the heightened-
pleading standard.  Recall that the heightened pleading standard under 
Rule 9(b) evolved to require pleadings based on internal information, 
but now plaintiffs are faced with Rule 9(b)’s internal-information 
standard and the heightened scienter standard without discovery.52 
Second, Congress increased the probability that those who brought 
meritless securities-fraud claims would risk monetary sanctions.  Under 
Rule 11, attorneys must, among other things, not present any filing for 
an improper purpose (“such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or 
needlessly increase the cost of litigation”); they must ensure that their 
claims, defenses, and legal contentions are nonfrivolous; and they must 
ensure that their factual contentions have evidentiary support.  But Rule 
11 does not mandate a judicial inquiry on compliance at the conclusion 
of every case.  Congress perceived that the current Rule-11 mechanism 
was insufficient to deter the filing of frivolous suits.53  To strengthen 
Rule 11 in the private securities-litigation context, Congress, through 
the PSLRA, required courts at final adjudication of the suit to include in 
the record specific findings whether the parties and their attorneys 
complied with Rule 11’s requirements.54  If the court determines that a 
party did not comply with Rule 11, then the court is directed to impose 
sanctions in accordance with the Rule.55 
 
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged 
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense . . . .”). 
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
50. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 14–15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 693–94. 
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3) (2012).  The PSLRA does explicitly provide that during the stay a 
party with actual notice of the allegations must treat all discoverable evidence within that party’s 
control as if it were subject to a continuing request for production of documents under the Federal 
Rules.  The PSLRA does provide limited exceptions to the stay if the court finds that 
particularized discovery is necessary to either (1) preserve evidence; or (2) prevent undue 
prejudice to that party.  Id. 
52. See Sale, supra note 26, at 563–64. 
53. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 13–14. 
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c). 
55. Id. 
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Together, these rules—heightened pleading, the discovery stay, and 
the mandatory Rule-11 inquiry—have transformed the motion to 
dismiss into a significant barrier.  Courts have called the 10b-5 motion 
to dismiss an “acid test,”56 an “eye of a needle made smaller and 
smaller over the years by judicial decree and congressional action,”57 
and a return to “a ‘demurrer-like’ process that creates considerable 
hurdles that a plaintiff must overcome before any discovery is 
permitted.”58 
D. This Heightened Pleading Has Made the Motion to Dismiss the 
Main Event For Securities Cases 
What’s the upshot of the PSLRA and Tellabs?  First, plainly, motions 
to dismiss are prominent in securities-fraud litigation.  In virtually every 
case (96%), defendants move to dismiss.59  Generally, the parties won’t 
even discuss the possibility of settlement until the plaintiffs survive a 
motion to dismiss.60 
Second, now more than ten years out, we may safely conclude that 
the PSLRA has increased the rate at which securities-fraud cases are 
screened.  NERA Economic Consulting has concluded that “[d]ismissal 
rates have nearly doubled since the PSLRA.  Dismissals accounted for 
only 19.4% of dispositions for cases filed between 1991 and 1995.  
More recently, for cases filed between 2000 and 2004, dismissals have 
accounted for 38.2% of dispositions.”61  Numerous other studies 
 
56. Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
57. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 235 (5th Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam with O’Connor, J., sitting by special designation). 
58. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 11-civ-5026, 2013 
WL 3389473, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2013). 
59. DR. RENZO COMOLLI ET AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN 
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2012 FULL-YEAR REVIEW: SETTLEMENTS UP; 
ATTORNEYS’ FEES DOWN 16 (2013) [hereinafter COMOLLI ET AL., RECENT TRENDS IN 
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION], available at http://www.nera.com/nera-files/ 
PUB_Year_End_Trends_01.2013.pdf.  It’s worth noting that defense counsel at this Conference 
stressed that defendants do not move to dismiss arbitrarily.  Rather, defendants are keenly aware 
that a weak motion to dismiss may damage the defendant’s credibility with the court. 
60. According to a survey of in-depth interviews of securities litigators, “settlement 
discussions almost never take place until after the motion [to dismiss] is filed, and . . . settlement 
discussions typically do not take place until after the class action has survived the motion to 
dismiss.”  Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and Officers’ 
Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 775 (2009). 
61. TODD FOSTER ET AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER 
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: FILINGS PLUMMET SETTLEMENTS SOAR 4 (2007) (internal citations 
omitted), available at http://www.mmc.com/knowledgecenter/BRO_Recent_Trends_SEC1288-
final.pdf.  The report cautions, though, that the 
post-PSLRA dismissal rate may be slightly overstated, as it may include some 
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conclude that the PSLRA resulted in district courts granting an 
increased percentage of motions to dismiss.62 
One interesting recent trend is that in the past five years, the rate of 
dismissals appears to be increasing.  NERA Economic Consulting 
concludes that “[d]ismissal rates appear to be rising.  Almost all cases 
filed from 2000 to 2006 have been resolved.  Dismissal rates in those 
years have progressively increased from 32% to 36% in 2000–2002 to 
43% to 47% in 2004–2006.”63  And “[o]n a preliminary basis, it appears 
that dismissal rates continued to increase in 2007 to 2009, as 44% to 
49% of cases filed in those years have already been dismissed.”64  
 
dismissals without prejudice that will be reversed by amended and better-pled 
complaints or dismissals with prejudice that will be successfully appealed.  There is no 
indication that dismissal rates have continued to rise after an initial adjustment to the 
tougher pleading provisions of PSLRA. 
Id. 
62. See FREDERICK DUNBAR ET AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS VI: 
TRENDS IN SECURITIES LITIGATION AND THE IMPACT OF PSLRA 6 (1999) (observing that the 
dismissal rate after the PSLRA increased from about 12% to between 25 and 28%); David M. 
Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998: The Sun 
Sets on California’s Blue Sky Laws, 54 BUS. LAW. 1, 39–40 (1998) (surveying 100 rulings on a 
motion to dismiss during 1996 and 1997 and finding that more than half (60%) of those motions 
were granted in some form: fifteen motions were granted with prejudice; thirty-four were granted 
with leave to amend; and eleven were granted in part and denied in part); Richard H. Walker, 
Introduction to the Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Symposium, 76 
WASH. U. L.Q. 447, 448–49 (1998) (observing that “it is not too soon to conclude that the Act is 
having at least some bite at the federal level, making it tougher for plaintiffs to proceed.  While 
the Act has not chilled plaintiffs from filing suit, it apparently has made early dismissals more 
commonplace.  In the 280 class actions filed during 1996 and 1997, we are aware of sixty-three in 
which there have been rulings on a motion to dismiss.  In more than half of these cases, fifty-six 
percent of the motions to dismiss have been granted in some form.  By contrast, Congress heard 
evidence that in 1992, only approximately forty percent of all federal securities class actions were 
dismissed on a motion prior to trial.  Available data shows that in 1990 and 1991, thirty-eight 
percent of the cases filed by a leading plaintiff law firm were dismissed on motion.” (internal 
citations omitted omitted)).  I’ve been unable to locate any studies that attempt to measure 
“shadow dismissals”—cases where in a pre-motion conference, the court provides direction to 
plaintiff’s counsel to dismiss and re-file or dismisses from the bench entirely.  See Jonathan K. 
Youngwood, The Limits of Bright-Line Rules and the Challenges of Defending Clients in a 
Constantly Changing Legal Environment, ASPATORE, Sept. 2012, available at 2012 WL 
3279514, at *6–*7 (describing a shadow dismissal in a securities case). 
63. COMOLLI ET AL., RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION, supra note 
59, at 24 (internal citation omitted). 
64. Id.  Professor Steinberg notes that these dismissal rates are misleading in that they are 
artificially low because, as a result of the PSLRA and the Supreme Court’s restrictive 
interpretations on the scope of the securities laws, plaintiffs institute federal securities class 
actions against fewer defendants than before the PSLRA.  Marc. I. Steinberg, Pleading Securities 
Fraud Claims—Only Part of the Story, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 603, 607 (2014).  Steinberg observes 
that, as contrasted with yesteryear, federal securities class-action complaints alleging fraud-based 
violations typically name only: (1) key executive officers (such as the chief executive officer, 
chief financial officer, and chief operating officer); (2) the chair of the board of directors; (3) 
outside directors who serve on key committees (such as the audit or compensation committee) 
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Cornerstone Research likewise concludes that “for filings in cohort 
years 2008 through 2010, a larger percentage of cases were dismissed 
than in prior years.  For filings in the 2008 cohort, 50% have already 
been dismissed.  For the 2009 and 2010 filing cohorts, dismissals 
increased to 53% and 56% respectively.  These percentages are likely to 
increase in the future as ongoing cases are resolved.”65 
Whether this increased dismissal rate is related to Tellabs or the 
Supreme Court’s other recent securities-fraud decisions66 has not yet 
been the subject of empirical study.  In an informal survey of district 
court decisions in the months after Tellabs, however, Harold S. 
Bloomenthal and Samuel Wolff found that for cases resolving motions 
to dismiss and citing Tellabs, 65% of those motions were granted.67  
The authors are careful not to read too much into their findings, 
however, as the sample was limited and they did not compare dismissals 
with a cross section of PSLRA cases decided pre-Tellabs.68  So we too 
take these findings for anecdotal evidence, but not hard science.  
Interestingly, a recent paper by Professors Stephen Choi and Adam 
Pritchard concludes that Tellabs is having some effect, namely unifying 
 
whose alleged misconduct while serving as a committee member caused the improprieties; (4) the 
auditors; and (5) perhaps the underwriters.  Whereas collateral actors—including attorneys, 
accountants (who have not certified financial statements), commercial and investment bankers 
(and their representatives), and consultants—are named as defendants in these class actions on 
relatively rare occasions. 
65. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2013 MID-YEAR 
ASSESSMENT 15 (2013), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/getattachment/07ff7c1f-b775-
417c-9d6c-59cba194cb75/Securities-Class-Action-Filings%e2%80%942013-Mid-YearAsse.aspx. 
66. Supreme Court decisions since 2005 that further narrowed the scope of 10b-5 liability 
might explain the uptick in dismissals.  In 2005, in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, the 
Court said that 10b-5 does not “provide investors with broad insurance against market losses,” 
and held that plaintiffs could not plead or prove loss causation by alleging just artificial inflation.  
544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005).  One study found that Dura resulted in a decreased number of class 
actions being filed, but did not assess the decisions’ effect on dismissal rates.  Scotland M. 
Duncan, Note, Dura’s Effect on Securities Class Actions, 27 J.L. & COM. 137 (2008).  In 2008, in 
Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., the Court said that “[o]verseas firms 
with no exposure to our securities laws could be deterred from doing business here,” and then 
rejected the notion of scheme liability for private actions under Rule 10b-5.  552 U.S. 148, 164 
(2008).  Then, in 2010, in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the Court said that “some fear 
that [the United States] has become the Shangri-La of class-action litigation for lawyers 
representing those allegedly cheated in foreign securities markets,” and then foreclosed any 
private 10b-5 remedy for securities transactions that occurred outside the United States.  130 S. 
Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010).  In 2011 in Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders, the Court 
said that the private remedy under Rule 10b-5 must be given a “narrow scope” and then limited 
the Rule 10b-5 remedy to only those who “ultimately ha[ve] authority over a false statement.”  
131 S. Ct. 2296, 2303 (2011). 
67. 2 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 29:62, 
at 454 (2013 ed.). 
68. Id. 
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the pleading standard.  They studied a sample of securities-fraud class 
actions filed between 2003 and 2007, and found that Tellabs correlates 
with a lower dismissal rate on scienter grounds in the Ninth Circuit 
(which had applied the most rigorous pleading standard before the 
decision), but left, largely unaffected, dismissal rates in the other 
circuits.69  Additionally, the authors found a decrease in low-value 
settlements (which are generally associated with meritless or weak 
claims) in those circuits applying moderate dismissal standards.70  The 
study did not measure, however, whether the total dismissal number 
increased or decreased after Tellabs. 
What element of a securities-fraud case is the focal point of a motion 
to dismiss?  Scienter.  Professors Choi and Pritchard find that, in a 
sample of securities-fraud class actions filed between 2003 and 2007, 
scienter is the basis for dismissal (at least in part) more than 43% of the 
time and that same argument is rejected in nearly a quarter of cases.71  
Additionally, an analysis of thirty-six district court decisions from 2012 
that dismissed securities-fraud claims found that in 72% of those 
rulings, the court found scienter inadequate for the entire case, and that 
in only marginally more cases (77%), the court found scienter 
inadequate with respect to at least some claims.72 
Materiality is also a common dismissal ground.  According to 
Professors Choi and Pritchard, district courts grant dismissal (at least in 
part) in more than 10% of the cases for lack of materiality.73  Others 
find that materiality plays a more prominent role on motions to dismiss.  
For instance, Professor David Hoffman analyzed 472 securities-fraud 
decisions and found that 385 of them addressed materiality, and of 
those, 44% dismissed at least one claim as immaterial as a matter of 
law.74  Professors Stephen Bainbridge and G. Mitu Gulati likewise 
surveyed motions to dismiss and found that more than 70% of their 
 
69. Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, The Supreme Court’s Impact on Securities Class 
Actions: An Empirical Assessment of Tellabs, J.L. ECON. & ORG. 850, 852 (2012). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 862 tbl.3.  One caveat is that there is no indication that this study accounted for 
“elemental bleed”—considerations that are supposed to drive a court in deciding a single, isolated 
element also cloud evaluation of other unrelated elements.  Credit is owed to Professor Geoffrey 
C. Rapp for the term.  See Geoffrey C. Rapp, Rewiring the DNA of Securities Fraud Litigation: 
Amgen’s Missed Opportunity, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1475, 1479 (2013). 
72. Wendy Gerwick Couture, The Falsity-Scienter Inference, 40 SEC. REG. L.J. 303, 304 
(2012). 
73. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 69, at 862 tbl.3. 
74. David A. Hoffman, The “Duty” to Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537, 
563–64 (2006). 
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sample involved materiality determinations in favor of the defendants.75 
The prominence of these two elements in dismissal rates is consistent 
with the idea that the motion to dismiss is more akin to summary 
judgment.  The Supreme Court has described one of these elements—
materiality—as a quintessential jury question because it requires 
“delicate assessments of the inferences a ‘reasonable shareholder’ 
would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those 
inferences to him.”76  Likewise, the other element—scienter—has been 
described by the Court as normally a “matter of inference from 
circumstantial evidence,” evidence that by definition lends itself to two 
reasonable conclusions from the same facts.77 
II. TO ACCOUNT FOR THE SECURITIES LAWS’ HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OF 
COMPLAINTS, PLAINTIFFS MUST SPEND MORE TIME IN THE PREFILING 
PHASE FINDING SUFFICIENT, RELIABLE CORROBORATION OF THEIR 
ALLEGATIONS 
The reforms by the PSLRA and the standard in Tellabs encourage 
plaintiffs to spend more time gathering facts in the prefiling phase to 
corroborate the allegations in their complaints.78  Securities-fraud 
complaints that contain reliable corroboration of their allegations are 
more likely to survive dismissal.79  This seems rather intuitive.  After 
all, the more evidence of a claim, the more likely it should pass through 
procedural screens.  What is notable, however, is that empirical studies 
and case law suggest that certain forms of corroboration appear stronger 
than others, and these forms may not necessarily suggest an actual 
fraud. 
 
75. Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way 
Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY 
L.J. 83, 116 n.94 (2002). 
76. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976). 
77. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 391 n.30 (1983). 
78. See City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 11-Civ-5026, 
2013 WL 3389473, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2013) (“As a combined result of pleading 
requirements set forth in the [PSLRA] . . . and in recent Supreme Court decisions such as 
[Tellabs], a securities class action cannot survive a motion to dismiss unless it provides 
considerable factual detail supporting each of the essential elements of a securities fraud 
claim. . . . While designed to give district courts a ‘gatekeeper’ responsibility to derail dubious 
class action lawsuits at the outset, an unintended consequence has been to cause plaintiffs’ 
counsel to undertake surreptitious pre-pleading investigations designed to obtain ‘dirt’ from 
dissatisfied corporate employees.”). 
79. See Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 
1498 (2004) (“Lawsuits relating to more obvious indicia of fraud, such as accounting 
restatements, are more prevalent in the post-PSLRA . . . time period.”). 
WUNDERLICH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2014  10:49 PM 
756 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  45 
A. Potential Evidence of Corporate Fraud 
At the threshold, securities fraud is concealment of the truth, and so, 
by its nature, without discovery, these cases pose special challenges to 
uncovering evidence to corroborate allegations.80  In securities-fraud 
cases, discovery is stayed pending any motion to dismiss.81  So what 
kinds of corroboration are available? 
A useful starting point is to consider who discloses corporate fraud.  
When we do so, we find that there is no shortage of potential evidence 
out there.  A 2007 study by several academics examined which 
mechanisms detect corporate fraud.82  They derived a sample of 216 
cases of alleged corporate frauds and identified who was involved in the 
fraud detection.83  They found that it takes “a village” to detect fraud, 
and no single fraud detector dominates.84  They found that six different 
sources accounted for at least 10% of the detections, but no single 
source was responsible for more than 17% of detections.85  What 
sources did the study identify?  Employees—”the most important 
external governance group with 17% of the cases”; media (13%); and 
industry regulators (13%).86  The remaining sources include stock 
 
80. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 377 
(1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (asserting that “[t]he real burden on most investors . . . is the 
initial matter of discovering whether a violation of the securities laws occurred at all.  This is 
particularly the case for victims of the classic fraud-like case that often arises under § 10(b). . . . 
The most extensive and corrupt schemes may not be discovered within the time allowed for 
bringing an express cause of action under the 1934 Act.”); S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 9 (2002) 
(stating that “the best cons are designed so that even after victims are cheated, they will not know 
who cheated them, or how”). 
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012).  When Congress wrote that a stay applied to “all” 
discovery upon “any” motion to dismiss, Congress meant “all” discovery upon “any” motion to 
dismiss.  That is, any defendant’s motion to dismiss will stay discovery entirely, not just as to that 
defendant but even as to nonparties or potential defendants.  See, e.g., In re Carnegie Int’l Corp. 
Sec. Litig., 107 F. Supp. 2d 676, 679–80 (D. Md. 2000).  Courts have held that even a 
defendant’s suggestion that a motion to dismiss is coming is enough to stay discovery.  See, e.g., 
In re Firstenergy Corp. Sec. Litig., 229 F.R.D. 541, 543–44 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (“Although 
FirstEnergy has not yet filed its motion to dismiss, it has advised the Court of its intent to do 
so. . . . In such an instance, . . . the PSLRA’s discovery stay provision applies.”). 
82. I.J. Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle On Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 
2213 (2010). 
83. To be more precise, the authors gathered data on a sample of alleged frauds that took place 
in U.S. companies with more than $750 million in assets between 1996 and 2004.  Id.  In their 
sample, plaintiffs brought securities-fraud class actions against the companies under either the 
1933 or 1934 Act between 1996 and 2004.  Id. at 2217.  The authors then screened the sample for 
“frivolous” suits (dismissed cases or settled cases for an amount less than $3 million) to end up 
with a sample of 216 cases of alleged corporate frauds.  Id. at 2213, 2217. 
84. Id. at 2224. 
85. Id. at 2224–26. 
86. Id. at 2226. 
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analysts, auditors, the company’s clients or competitors, equity holders, 
law firms, the SEC, and short sellers.87  A survey of in-depth interviews 
with plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers likewise found that plaintiffs 
learned of potential frauds from “former employees, disgruntled 
investors, or referring attorneys who represent the prospective plaintiff 
for other purposes, such as real estate transactions or estate planning.”88 
Another useful starting point for potential sources is to consider what 
events are considered consistent with fraud and to look for public 
reports about those events.  It’s been long accepted that parallel action 
by the SEC, restatements of earnings, corporate bankruptcies, and 
insider trading are considered consistent with allegations of fraud.89 
Parallel SEC Proceedings.  Parallel SEC investigations or 
enforcement actions may suggest that a securities class action has merit.  
The SEC is not motivated by large class-action fees, and as a 
government agency, it has an air of credibility.  Likewise, budget 
constraints encourage the SEC to devote those limited resources to 
cases that it judges to be strong.90  Courts have said that even a 
corroborated SEC complaint may be strong evidence of the merit of the 
plaintiffs’ case.91 
 
87. Id. at 2225 tbl.2. 
88. Baker & Griffith, supra note 60, at 770. 
89. This list is not exclusive.  For example, Professor Charles W. Murdock catalogues four 
ways investors can acquire internal company information and not all of which overlap with those 
described above: (1) a special study by the board of directors, (2) a bankruptcy report, (3) a 
restatement of financial results, and (4) an informant from the company.  Charles W. Murdock, 
Why Not Tell the Truth?: Deceptive Practices and the Economic Meltdown, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
801, 831–32 (2010). 
90. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc., 347 F.3d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Given the vast 
resources of the federal government, it might seem that the government would rarely if ever be 
seriously inconvenienced by being compelled to litigate in a district more convenient to the 
defendant.  But such a suggestion would be unrealistic.  Federal agencies have limited resources, 
and the SEC in particular is often outgunned by the affluent defendants that it sues.  The SEC 
cannot afford a regional office in every state.”). 
91. See, e.g., In re Cylink Sec. Litig., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1080, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2001) 
(holding that allegations of premature revenue recognition in violation of Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) “combined with the other transactions detailed in the SEC 
complaint, provide strong circumstantial evidence” that the defendant acted with scienter); City of 
Painesville, Ohio v. First Montauk Fin. Corp., 178 F.R.D. 180, 185–90 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (finding 
complaint met heightened pleading standard and noting that company previously disclosed an 
SEC investigation and indictments); see also Hill v. State St. Corp., No. 09-CV-12146, 2011 WL 
3420439, at *10 (D. Mass. Aug. 3, 2011) (“At this point—the pleading stage—I cannot ignore 
that Plaintiffs’ complaint is buttressed by, among other things, allegations made by six 
confidential sources and the booty from an [eighteen-month] investigation by the California 
AG.”); cf. In re LaBranche Sec. Litig., 333 F. Supp. 2d 178, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (allowing 
plaintiffs to lift the automatic stay of discovery while a  motion to dismiss was pending because 
“[i]n this case, the SEC and NYSE investigated and are continuing to investigate the precise 
schemes alleged by Lead Plaintiffs in the Complaint.  As a result of those investigations, 
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Earnings Restatements.  A restatement of earnings by the company 
may also corroborate the plaintiffs’ allegations of fraud.  A restatement 
is reliable in that the source of the restatement is the company itself, and 
some believe restatements of revenue or income are akin to public 
admissions that financial statements contained material misstatements 
when made.92  
Bankruptcy.  Studies have confirmed that fraud on securities markets 
is more likely to be committed by desperate agents who fear that they 
are in the last period of employment than by those secure in their jobs 
and with the financial position of the company.93  Additionally, the 
materials generated from a corporate bankruptcy—such as pleadings, 
transcripts, examiner reports, etc.—may provide a wealth of internal 
information for plaintiffs.94 
Insider Trading.  Insider trading is a classic feature of securities-
fraud complaints.  “For a spokesperson to cash in his own stock can . . . 
be like a ship’s captain exiting into the safety of a lifeboat while 
assuring the passengers that all is well.”95  By consulting publicly 
available information, plaintiffs can find instances of corporate insiders 
trading the company’s stock.96 
But identifying corroborative evidence or events consistent with 
fraud allegations is only half of the task.  That corroborative evidence 
and those events must provide reliable indicators of fraud in the eyes of 
the district judge.  Over the past decade or so, case law and empirical 
studies have revealed that some of these forms of corroboration appear 
more reliable than others.  That is, some receive more favorable 
treatment under the case law and appear more likely to survive 
dismissal than others (I hedge by saying “appear” because I’m not 
aware of any studies that compare the forms of corroboration head to 
 
LaBranche [(the defendant)] has agreed to pay more than $63.5 million to settle the regulators’ 
claims.”). 
92. Sherrie Raiken Savett, Plaintiffs’ Vision of Securities Litigation: Current Trends and 
Strategies, SN084 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 375, 433 (2008). 
93. Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities 
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 725–27; see also Mitu Gulati, When 
Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing is Coming to an End: The Case of Interim 
Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 694–95 (1999) (noting that when a manager perceives 
himself to be in a final-period situation, he will no longer be disciplined by the fear of 
reputational sanctions and may act entirely in his self-interest in order to obtain the maximum 
private payoff before permanently departing from the managerial scene). 
94. John M. Wunderlich, Bankruptcy’s Protection for Non-Debtors From Securities-Fraud 
Litigation, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 375, 409 (2011). 
95. In re Scholastic Corp., 252 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 2001). 
96. See, e.g., Malin v. XL Capital, 499 F. Supp. 2d 117, 131–33 (D. Conn. 2007) (collecting 
cases). 
WUNDERLICH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2014  10:49 PM 
2014] The Importance of the Prefiling Phase 759 
head, and because I don’t mean to advocate a universal rule that one 
form of corroboration will always be more reliable than another.).  I’ve 
shorthanded the forms of corroboration as either strong or weak.  Strong 
forms of corroboration include SEC actions, earnings restatements, and 
bankruptcies.  Weak forms of corroborative evidence include evidence 
of insider trading, inferences we can draw from shared experience, and 
accounts from confidential witnesses. 
B. Strong Forms of Corroboration 
Parallel SEC proceedings, accounting restatements, and a company’s 
bankruptcy are strong forms of corroboration as empirical studies 
suggest that allegations corroborated by these events are more likely to 
survive dismissal. 
1. SEC Proceedings 
Empirical studies have found that the absence of SEC proceedings 
exposes a complaint to an increased chance of dismissal.  In a pre-
Tellabs study of initial public offerings from 1990 to 1999 involving 
securities claims, Professor Choi found that claims lacking hard-
evidence of fraud—defined as an earnings restatement or SEC 
investigation or enforcement action—faced a lower probability of suit 
and a greater likelihood of receiving a dismissal or low-value settlement 
in the post-PSLRA period.97  Professor Sale also found that of post-
PSLRA decisions on a motion to dismiss from 1996 to 2000, those 
decisions in which the plaintiffs pleaded that the SEC investigated or 
was investigating survived 71% of the time—a dismissal rate, she said, 
that was about 20% higher than for claims without a similar 
allegation.98  Similarly, in a research paper from several law professors 
that studied securities settlements, the authors found that “[w]here the 
SEC has filed a parallel enforcement action—based on the same 
allegations made in a class action complaint—the class action was 
dismissed in only 12% of cases.”99  A survey of in-depth litigator 
interviews likewise concluded that the “sizzle” of an SEC 
investigation—of “‘executives being led out of the office in 
handcuffs’”—may make a plaintiff’s case more appealing to a judge or 
 
97. Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 598 (2007). 
98. Sale, supra note 45, at 950 n.178. 
99. Michael Klausner et al., When are Securities Class Actions Dismissed, When Do They 
Settle, and For How Much?—An Update 6 (Stanford Law Sch. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 
445, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2260831. 
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jury.100 
Even though parallel SEC action may increase the odds a case has of 
surviving dismissal, it is not always true that SEC complaints or 
investigations evidence fraud.  SEC complaints or investigations are just 
collections of unproven and contested allegations.  Thus, courts may 
reject plaintiffs’ attempts to rely upon allegations drawn from SEC 
complaints.101  Indeed, should a litigant rely solely on an SEC 
complaint, courts have held that such conduct would warrant sanctions 
for violating the Rule 11 duty to validate the truth and legal 
reasonableness of papers filed with the court.102 
The converse is true as well.  Although parallel SEC action may 
increase the likelihood a case has of surviving dismissal, it is not always 
true that the absence of parallel SEC action evidences aboveboard 
conduct.  For instance, as a result of a 2003 study, some scholars have 
concluded that private litigation fills an enforcement void created by the 
SEC’s inherent limitations (i.e., budget restraints, political jockeying, 
bureaucratic barriers, etc.).103  Indeed, the SEC appears to target smaller 
firms while private suits focus on larger ones.104 
2. Earnings Restatements 
Other studies have similarly found that the absence of earnings 
restatements hurts a case’s chances for surviving a motion to dismiss.  
In a sample of 150 motion to dismiss decisions from the Second and 
Ninth Circuits from 1996 to 2001, Professors Pritchard and Sale found 
that cases with misstatements about revenue recognition, a restatement 
of earnings, and other Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(“GAAP”) violations made dismissal less likely at least in the Second 
 
100. Baker & Griffith, supra note 60, at 788–89 (citation omitted). 
101. See, e.g., In re Connetics Corp. Sec. Litig., 542 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1005–06 (N.D. Cal. 
2008) (dismissing a complaint that relied solely on allegations found in SEC complaints); Geinko 
v. Padda, No. 00-CV-5070, 2002 WL 276236, at *5–*7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2002) (rejecting a 
complaint grounded merely on SEC allegations and lacking independent investigation). 
102. In re Connetics Corp., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1005–06; Geinko, 2002 WL 276236, at *6; see 
also In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 10-CV-1735, 2011 WL 5101787, at *10 n.5 (D. Ariz. 
Oct. 27, 2011) (noting that allegations from other complaints, which are unproven and 
uncontested, do not amount to facts and therefore do not satisfy Rule 11’s pleading requirement). 
103. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 
53 DUKE L.J. 737, 777 (2003) (finding that only 15% of settled securities class actions have a 
parallel SEC action). 
104. Id. at 777–78.  A later 2005 study by those same authors found that the SEC was more 
likely to target larger firms after the Enron debacle in 2001.  See James D. Cox & Randall S. 
Thomas, Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws: Have Things Changed Since 
Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 901–02 (2005). 
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Circuit.105  Similarly, Cornerstone Research finds that accounting 
cases—those involving allegations that the company issued financial 
statements inconsistent with GAAP, the fact most likely to lead to an 
earnings restatement—”are less likely to be dismissed” than non-
accounting cases.106  For instance, Cornerstone found that in 2005, 36% 
of accounting cases were dismissed, but 60% of non-accounting cases 
were dismissed.  And in 2006, 37% of accounting cases were dismissed 
(with 7% still pending resolution), but 49% of non-accounting cases 
were dismissed.107  And a 2002 study by Professors Marilyn Johnson, 
Karen Nelson, and Adam Pritchard compared suits that resulted in 
either dismissal or a low-value settlement ($2 million or less) with 
higher-value settlements, and found that accounting restatements were 
positively correlated with higher-value settlements.108  In addition, 
several Stanford law professors that studied securities settlements 
between 2006 and 2010 found that even “[l]eaving aside class actions 
with parallel SEC actions, cases that involved restatements were 
dismissed less frequently than cases that involve non-restatement 
accounting issues, which in turn were dismissed less frequently than are 
non-accounting cases.”109  Perhaps recognizing the increased likelihood 
that these cases will survive, other studies have found that after the 
PSLRA, plaintiffs brought an increased number of accounting-related 
cases.110 
Earnings restatements, too, are not necessarily indicative of fraud, 
although studies suggest this fact will help a case survive dismissal.  
Indeed, “[r]estatements of earnings are common.”111  So, they alone are 
usually insufficient to suggest that the defendant acted with fraudulent 
intent.112  Rather, the amount of a restatement must be large enough to 
 
105. A.C. Pritchard & Hilary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical Study of Motions 
to Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 125, 
146 (2005). 
106. ELAINE HARWOOD ET AL., CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, WHAT MAKES SECURITIES 
CLASS ACTIONS WITH ACCOUNTING ALLEGATIONS DIFFERENT? 1–2 (2011), available at 
http://www.cornerstone.com/getattachment/c6b4254e-5ea4-4f02-8949-beeb7d304ae2/What-Ma 
kes-Securities-Class-Actions-with-Accountin.aspx. 
107. Id. at 2. 
108. Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627, 646–47 (2007). 
109. Klausner, supra note 99, at 6. 
110. Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 913, 930–33 [hereinafter Perino, Did the PSLRA Work?]. 
111. Goldberg v. Household Bank, F.S.B., 890 F.2d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 1989). 
112. See Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1000 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In 
general, the mere publication of a restatement is not enough to create a strong inference of 
scienter.”). 
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suggest that fraud was the case or a restatement must be coupled with 
other evidence that suggests fraud.113 
3. Corporate Bankruptcy 
Likewise, the presence of a bankruptcy suggests that a 10b-5 case is 
more likely to survive dismissal.  In a 2013 study, Professor James J. 
Park found that securities cases against bankrupt companies were 
associated with more successful securities class actions and he suggests 
that courts use the fact of a company’s bankruptcy to corroborate the 
allegations of fraud.114  There’s also evidence that companies that settle 
securities-fraud class actions are more likely to have liquidity problems 
and file for bankruptcy.115   
Nevertheless, Professor Park found no support for the hypothesis that 
securities-fraud class actions against bankrupt companies are more 
likely to have merit than securities class actions against non-bankruptcy 
companies.  Rather, he said, securities class actions against bankrupt 
companies are perceived as having more merit than suits against non-
bankrupt companies.116 
* * * 
Before moving to the weak forms of corroboration, there are two 
aspects of this dynamic that should not escape notice.  First, instances of 
“strong” corroboration appear to be those least in need of a private, 
supplemental cause of action.  These sources are the SEC or the 
company itself in cases of earnings’ restatements or a bankruptcy filing.  
That is, these are cases in which the SEC is already pursuing fraud,117 
 
113. See, e.g., In re Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 324 F. Supp. 2d 474, 488–
89 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (collecting cases holding that “a large correction is some evidence of 
scienter” and concluding that the size and nature of the restatement suggested that the restatement 
was no mere error but the result of systemic accounting abuses); see also Baker & Griffith, supra 
note 60, at 788 (“A plaintiffs’ lawyer explained, ‘You need sex appeal, you know.  We used to 
think that just a restatement case was great because it was [an] admission, but you need more than 
just a restatement.  You need a restatement and you need some benefit[, you need to show] that 
somebody benefited by the wrong.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
114. James J. Park, Securities Class Actions and Bankrupt Companies, 111 MICH. L. REV. 
547, 577, 579–82 (2013). 
115. See Lynn Bai et al., Lying and Getting Caught: An Empirical Study of the Effect of 
Securities Class Action Settlements on Targeted Firms, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1877, 1912 & n.88 
(2010) (acknowledging generally the liquidity problems that companies face after settlement). 
116. Park, supra note 114, at 579–82. 
117. Where there is already public enforcement of the securities laws, one may question the 
necessity of additional private enforcement of the securities laws.  Other laws, like the False 
Claims Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, allow 
public enforcement to supersede private enforcement.  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012) (Fair 
Labor Standards Act); id. § 626(c)(1) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); 31 U.S.C. §§ 
3730(b)(1), (c)(1)–(2) (2012) (False Claims Act). 
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cases in which the defendants have already announced to investors a 
public mea culpa (an earnings restatement), and cases in which 
investors aren’t likely to recover much anyway because of bankruptcy.  
Second, plaintiffs can uncover strong forms of corroborative evidence 
cheaply and quickly.  SEC actions, announcements of earnings 
restatements, and bankruptcies are all captured in public filings.  The 
ease with which plaintiffs can get a hold of these kinds of corroboration 
may explain why after the PSLRA, securities-fraud cases were filed just 
as quickly as before.118 
C. Weak Forms of Corroboration 
The SEC doesn’t sue in every case.  Indeed, one of the premises of 
the 10b-5 private action is that it acts as a necessary supplement to the 
SEC’s enforcement power.119  Moreover, not every company goes 
bankrupt.  And for a company to out-and-out admit securities fraud is 
rare as well.  So, if plaintiffs have a fraud case apart from these sources, 
then they must rely upon other evidence available at the prefiling phase.  
These other forms, to name a few, include evidence of insider trading, 
inferences from shared experience and common sense, and finally 
internal company information obtained from private investigators or 
former employees (i.e., confidential witnesses).  I refer to these forms as 
weak forms of corroboration because studies do not suggest that their 
presence does much to prevent the dismissal of a securities-fraud case 
or because case law is largely suspect of these sources as reliable 
proxies for fraud. 
1. Insider Trading 
The increased prevalence of option-based compensation schemes 
makes it easy to allege insider trading in virtually every case, which 
means that incidents of insider trading are coincidental in about every 
securities-fraud case.  Thus, the case law uniformly holds that to suggest 
fraud, insider trading must be “unusual and suspicious.”120  The bottom 
 
118. See Perino, supra note 110, at 913 (finding that after the PSLRA, securities actions were 
filed as quickly as they were before the Act’s passage). 
119. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1201 (2013) 
(“Congress, the Executive Branch, and this Court, moreover, have recognized that meritorious 
private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential supplement to criminal 
prosecutions and civil enforcement actions brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
120. See, e.g., Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162, 184 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(quoting In re PEC Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 418 F.3d 379, 390 (4th Cir. 2005); Ronconi v. 
Larkin, 253 F.3d 423, 435 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
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line is that courts are becoming inoculated to these kinds of allegations 
as suggestive of fraud. 
According to Professor Sale,  
[a]lthough trades are included in complaints in the hope that their 
presence will decrease the likelihood of a successful motion to 
dismiss, approximately 62% of the complaints containing such 
allegations are dismissed. . . . [I]t is more difficult for the plaintiffs to 
use stock trades, no matter how questionable, to meet the scienter 
requirement, and, thereby, to survive a motion to dismiss.121   
Other studies confirm Professor Sale’s conclusion that insider-trading 
allegations don’t do much to bolster an inference of fraud.  For 
example, a 2002 study by Professors Johnson, Nelson, and Pritchard 
compared suits that resulted in either dismissal or a low-value 
settlement with higher-value settlements, and found that insider-trading 
allegations were positively related to a higher probability of higher-
value settlements in the pre-PSLRA period, but not the post-PSLRA 
period.122  Perhaps recognizing that insider-trading allegations are not 
as compelling as plaintiffs would hope, the incidence of plaintiffs 
alleging insider trading in securities-fraud complaints has trended 
downward since 2005.123 
2. Inferences from Shared Experience and Common Sense 
Another way to bolster allegations of fraud is to ask judges to draw 
on their experience and commonsense to infer fraud.  Two of the ways 
we see this play out in securities-fraud litigation is when plaintiffs 
contend that a court may draw a strong inference of scienter based on 
the defendant’s motive to commit fraud or because the subject of the 
alleged fraud concerned one of the company’s core operations. 
The likelihood that these kinds of allegations will or won’t stave off 
dismissal has not been empirically studied.  But the case law suggests 
that these sorts of corroboration are weak.  For instance, we can assume 
that generally, everyone wants to stay employed,124 make their 
 
121. Sale, supra note 45, at 925. 
122. Johnson, supra note 108, at 646–47. 
123. COMOLLI ET AL., RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION, supra 
note 59, at 15. 
124. See, e.g., Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that 
defendants had “ample motive” to mislead investors where, shortly before taking control, the 
company had “fired its previous executive for failing to improve the company’s revenue,” and so 
the defendants “had especial cause to think that they would lose their jobs if they failed to 
produce results”); Serabian v. Amoskeag Bank Shares, 24 F.3d 357, 368 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(recognizing that the defendants were motivated to commit fraud “to save their salaries or jobs”). 
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company profitable, increase financial compensation in some way,125 or 
portray their company and their work in a positive light.126  But, as 
courts have been quick to point out, all corporate executives share these 
general aspirations, so these motives make poor proxies for 
distinguishing between culpable and nonculpable persons.127 
Similarly, plaintiffs ask courts to infer that management knew about 
fraud when that fraud concerns the company’s “core operations.”128  
The inference stems from “two common-sense principles” that have 
endured the PSLRA: first, it is reasonable to infer that when a situation 
occurs within the business’ core operations, senior management is likely 
aware of its existence and, second, it is reasonable to infer that senior 
executives are aware of the scheme when the scheme is pervasive and 
widespread within the company.129  Similar to asking a court to infer 
motive based on shared experience or common sense, courts are 
likewise reluctant to infer that management acted with fraudulent intent 
where the only indicator is that the subject of the fraud concerns the 
company’s core operations.130  Indeed, the case in which a court will 
infer scienter based on the “core operations” inference alone is 
 
125. See, e.g., Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999); Stevens v. 
InPhonic, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 2d 105, 123 (D.D.C. 2009). 
126. See, e.g., San Leandro Emergency Med. Grp. Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Co., 75 
F.3d 801, 814 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that all companies desire to maintain high bond and credit 
ratings). 
127. See, e.g., Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 139–40 (2d Cir. 2001) (recognizing that motive 
to increase stock value or compensation, standing alone, does not prove fraudulent intent); 
Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 622 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that “assertions that a 
corporate officer or director committed fraud in order to retain an executive position . . . simply 
do not, in themselves, adequately plead motive”); see also In re Rigel Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 
697 F.3d 869, 884 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege motive to 
commit fraud because “allegations of routine corporate objectives such as the desire to obtain 
good financing and expand are not, without more, sufficient to allege scienter; to hold otherwise 
would support a finding of scienter for any company that seeks to enhance its business 
prospects”). 
128. A variant of this is Professor Couture’s “falsity-scienter” inference, which posits that a 
statement’s well-pleaded falsity gives rise to a strong inference that the speaker acted with 
scienter.  Her point is that there are some subjects (the speaker’s marital status, the speaker’s 
name, etc.) that the speaker must know or would be reckless in not knowing, and so a false 
statement about a subject of that kind must have been made with scienter.  See Couture, supra 
note 72 (noting that “a false statement about one’s marital status gives rise to a strong inference, 
at the very least, of recklessness”). 
129. City of Austin Police Ret. Sys. v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 932, 949 (S.D. 
Ind. 2005). 
130. See generally Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Messy Mental Markers: 
Inferring Scienter from Core Operations in Securities Fraud Litigation, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 507 
(2012) (surveying cases and explaining that courts are reluctant to infer scienter based on the 
“core operations” inference alone). 
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“exceedingly rare.”131 
3. Confidential Witnesses 
One of the most common ways in which plaintiffs seek to shore up 
their allegations is by adding accounts from confidential witnesses.  
Their accounts may go a long way to establishing scienter.  To explain, 
one way to show scienter is to allege that the defendant had access to 
contemporary reports or data that contradicted the public statements.132  
That is, plaintiffs may effectively demonstrate scienter by juxtaposing 
what the firm and management told the investing public and what they 
said internally—what was said internally did not match what was said to 
the investing public.133  Employees account for a significant portion of 
external mechanisms that detect corporate fraud.134  According to a 
study by several academics, employees account for 17% of fraud 
detection.135  That is, a significant source of fraud detection is the 
company’s own current and former employees.  And this makes sense: 
former and current employees are primed to uncover facts concealed 
from public investors because these employees enjoy inside status.136 
Contrary to the other forms of prefiling investigation, obtaining 
confidential-witness accounts is not cheap.  Often, this kind of 
discovery requires hiring private investigators.  It also takes time to find 
and make contact with these witnesses.  And when an investigator or 
plaintiffs’ attorney makes contact, there’s no guarantee that the witness 
 
131. S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2008); accord In re 
Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1191 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
132. See, e.g., Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp., 380 F.3d 1226, 1230 
(9th Cir. 2004) (“The most direct way to show both that a statement was false when made and 
that the party making the statement knew that it was false is via contemporaneous reports or data, 
available to the party, which contradict the statement.”); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (“[T]he inference may arise where the complaint sufficiently alleges that the 
defendants . . . knew facts or had access to information suggesting that their public statements 
were not accurate”). 
133. See, e.g., Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, 25 F.3d 1124, 1129 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting 
allegations of fraud where plaintiffs failed to contrast public disclosure with contemporaneous 
internal documents or data). 
134. Dyck, supra note 82, at 2214. 
135. Id. 
136. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street 
by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 108–09 
(2012) (“Even though outside interests—like market arbitrageurs, short sellers, and regulators—
may have reputational or financial incentives to seek out fraud, for such actors ‘detecting fraud is 
like looking for a needle in a haystack.’  Insider-employee whistleblowers ‘clearly have the best 
access to information,’ since ‘[f]ew, if any frauds can be committed without the knowledge and 
often the support of several employees.’  Insiders often also have the technical skills to 
comprehend the sometimes complex financial transactions that are at the core of many modern 
instances of fraud.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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will even talk with them (there can be no pay for testimony137) or tell 
them the truth.138  Moreover, even if the witness does talk, there’s a risk 
that the witness may later recant139 when confronted by a former 
employer threatening legal action for breach of fiduciary, violation of a 
confidentiality agreement, or computer fraud. 
Even if investigators and attorneys obtain confidential witnesses’ 
accounts, the reliability of these sources’ accounts is hotly debated in 
securities-fraud litigation.  Anonymous employees don’t enjoy the 
imprimatur of being a government agency or akin to an admission by 
the defendant itself.  They’re usually ex-employees.  Their termination 
or resignation (possibly under bad terms) may give these witnesses 
reason to gripe, so courts are naturally suspicious of them.  
“Snitch[es] . . . liars,”140 and axe-grinders;141 a “gimmick” for obtaining 
costly discovery;142 gossip-regurgitators and innuendo-makers;143 not 
“privy to the big picture;”144 and ultimately “not far above a false 
witness,”145 are just a few of the phrases used by courts to describe 
these sources.146 
 
137. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt.3 (1983) (“[I]t is not improper to pay a 
witness’s expenses or to compensate an expert witness on terms permitted by law.  The common 
law rule in most jurisdictions is that it is improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for 
testifying and that it is improper to pay an expert witness a contingent fee.”). 
138. Cf. Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1240 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that one 
of the reasons “why courts may be skeptical of confidential sources” is that “lying to the police or 
to law enforcement in general will likely lead to much harsher consequences than lying to a 
plaintiff’s attorney, so statements by confidential police informants may be more reliable than 
conversations between plaintiffs’ attorneys and whistleblowers”). 
139. See, e.g., City of Livonia Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co., 711 F.3d 754, 760–61 (7th Cir. 
2013) (instance of confidential witness recanting); In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 
851 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (same). 
140. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the 
Proper Role of Confidential Informants in Securities Fraud Litigation, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 345, 356 
(2008) (quoting Judge Posner during the oral argument in Higginbotham where the panel stated 
“having a confidential witness doesn’t strengthen the allegation . . . . Such a person can be any 
kind of snitch, any kind of liar . . . [making] anonymous accusations against a company”). 
141. See Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that 
confidential sources may have “axes to grind”). 
142. City of Livonia Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 711 F.3d at 759. 
143. See, e.g., In re Metawave Commc’ns. Corp. Sec. Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1068 
(W.D. Wash. 2003) (“The Court must be able to tell whether a confidential witness is speaking 
from personal knowledge, or merely regurgitating gossip and innuendo.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
144. Material Yard Workers Local 1175 Benefit Funds v. Men’s Wearhouse Inc., No. H-09-
3265, 2011 WL 3059229, at *6 (S.D. Tex. July 22, 2011). 
145. Id. 
146. The distrust of confidential witnesses in securities litigation is a not a view that is 
uniformly held.  See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Imposing a 
general requirement of disclosure of confidential sources serves no legitimate pleading purpose 
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Plaintiffs must then persuade courts that these witnesses’ accounts 
are trustworthy and reliable.  This inquiry depends on whether the 
witnesses’ job suggests that they were in a position to know the facts 
they claim to know, whether they provided detailed information to 
suggest they have actual knowledge, whether they supported their 
allegations with other sources or documents, and whether multiple 
sources across the company are consistent with the account.147  (It is 
important to note that these are just factors to guide analysis, not control 
it.148)  Indeed, to ensure the reliability of these sources, there have been 
instances where, before a motion to dismiss, a court allowed defendants 
to depose these witnesses or the district judge reviewed plaintiffs’ 
attorneys’ investigator’s notes summarizing the witness interviews.149 
Once confidential witnesses are shown to be reliable and if they 
corroborate the plaintiffs’ story, then the case may have a better chance 
of success.150  A 2011 informal survey of dismissal rulings in 10b-5 
subprime securities litigation found that if confidential witnesses were 
considered reliable sources—that is, described with sufficient 
 
while it could deter informants from providing critical information to investigators in meritorious 
cases or invite retaliation against them.”); In re Cigna Corp. Sec. Litig., No. Civ. A. 02-8088, 
2006 WL 263631, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2006) (stating in a securities-fraud case that 
“[c]onfidential informants play a decidedly important role in many areas of public life”). 
147. See, e.g., Tellabs II, 513 F.3d 702, 712 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that the degree of detail 
provided and corroboration by multiple sources supports drawing strong factual inferences from 
confidential assertions); N.J. Carpenters Pension & Annuity Funds v. Biogen IDEC, Inc., 537 
F.3d 35, 51 (1st Cir. 2008) (providing an analytical framework for determining the reliability of 
confidential witnesses); see also In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 30 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(stating that “the number of different sources helps the complaint meet [the PSLRA’s pleading] 
standard.  Their consistent accounts reinforce one another and undermine any argument that the 
complaint relies unduly on the stories of just one or two former employees, possibly 
disgruntled.”). 
148. Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162, 193 (4th Cir. 2007) (Shedd, J., 
dissenting) (stating that “a personal aide or administrative assistant to the CEO could plausibly 
overhear a pertinent piece of information that may later form the basis for a securities fraud 
action, notwithstanding his job title”); Ethan D. Wohl, Confidential Informants in Private 
Litigation: Balancing Interests in Anonymity and Disclosure, 12 FORDHAM J CORP. & FIN. L. 
551, 561 (2007)  (stating that “job titles may convey little about actual job duties, and formal job 
duties may say little about whether an employee would have been privy to senior-level 
communications evidencing actionable misconduct”). 
149. See, e.g., Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. 
Corp., No. cv-10-2847, 2011 WL 4431154, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 7, 2011) (stating that the 
court reviewed plaintiffs’ investigator’s notes in camera before crediting confidential-witness 
allegations); Campo v. Sears Holdings, Corp., 635 F. Supp. 2d 323, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(ordering that defendants depose confidential witnesses to determine if they made statements 
attributable to them in the complaint) aff’d, 371 F. App’x 212 (2d Cir. 2010). 
150. See, e.g., Horowitz v. Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-227, 2013 
WL 1149670, at *10 (D. Vt. Mar. 20, 2013) (recognizing that a “critical difference” between the 
plaintiff’s allegations and allegations in another case that were deemed sufficient to allege a 
strong inference of scienter was the “credibility of the confidential witnesses in the two cases”). 
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particularity and satisfying some combination of the factors above—
then the complaint was likely to survive a motion to dismiss, but if 
those witnesses were not reliable, then the case was likely to be 
dismissed.151 
* * * 
I do not mean to say that it is always true that securities-fraud 
complaints that are strongly corroborated will always survive dismissal, 
or that securities-fraud complaints that are only somewhat corroborated 
will always be dismissed.  We need only consult a few examples to 
know that that is not the case.  For example, consider two appellate 
court decisions after Tellabs where the allegations appeared strongly 
corroborated, but resulted in dismissal. 
First, in Konkol v. Diebold, Inc.,152 the plaintiffs alleged that a 
voting-machine manufacturer—together with its senior managers—
schemed to inflate profits (and thereby its stock price) by booking 
revenue for the sale of machines that did not comply with applicable 
law.  The plaintiffs put forth several ways in which its allegations of 
fraud were corroborated, including, among other things, that the SEC 
and Department of Justice investigated the company’s practices; that an 
outside law firm warned that the machines’ purchasers would reject the 
voting machines because they did not comply with the law; that some 
defendants sold large amounts of the company’s stock only weeks after 
false financial reports inflated the company’s shares to an all-time high; 
and that confidential witnesses described the fraudulent scheme in detail 
and claimed that high-level officers of the company were involved.153  
According to the Sixth Circuit, these allegations were insufficient to 
satisfy Tellabs.154  According to the court, the government 
investigations could have resulted “from any number of causes” other 
than stock fraud,155 the plaintiffs did not allege that the law-firm 
warning made its way to top management,156 the plaintiffs did not 
provide a meaningful trading history that would have put the stock sales 
in context,157 and the confidential witnesses were described with too 
 
151. Christopher J. Miller, Note, “Don’t Blame Me, Blame the Financial Crisis”: A Survey of 
Dismissal Rulings in 10b-5 Suits for Subprime Securities Losses, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 310 
(2011). 
152. 590 F.3d 390, 395 (6th Cir. 2009). 
153. Id. at 395–404. 
154. Id. at 405. 
155. Id. at 402. 
156. Id. at 403. 
157. Id. at 399–400. 
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little detail for the court to consider them reliable sources.158 
Second, in Matrix Capital Management Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, 
Inc.,159 the plaintiffs alleged that the management fund made numerous 
fraudulent accounting disclosures over an extended period.  The firm 
allegedly went on an acquisition spree, buying several firms, including 
several foreign firms with no obligation to adhere to the accounting 
standards that applied to publicly traded companies.  To corroborate 
their claims, the plaintiffs observed that the company restated its 
earnings, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and was investigated and 
subpoenaed by the SEC.160  The Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
inference of scienter simply was not as compelling as the nonculpable 
inferences that executives were overwhelmed or negligent.161  The court 
said that the restatements were an honest attempt by management to get 
a handle on its newly acquired foreign businesses and that the 
government investigation was too speculative to add anything.162  The 
court did not address the weight to be afforded the defendant’s 
bankruptcy. 
Similarly, cases where the plaintiff’s allegations are not strongly 
corroborated may still survive dismissal as well.  In Matrixx Initiatives, 
Inc. v. Siracusano, the plaintiffs sued a manufacturer of a cold remedy 
for allegedly misleading the public about the safety of the drug.163  
According to the plaintiffs, the company knew or should have known 
that consumer reports and other accounts stating that the drug caused a 
loss of smell would have been material to investors, and that the failure 
to disclose this to investors would be to withhold information pertinent 
to their investment decisions.164  That drug accounted for about 70% of 
the company’s sales.165  The Supreme Court concluded that the 
plaintiffs alleged scienter—not because of a parallel government action, 
bankruptcy, restatement, insider trading, or confidential-witness 
statement—but because of the inferences we could draw from our 
shared experience based on the nature of the fraud alleged.166  The 
plaintiffs alleged that the company received reports from doctors 
claiming that some of their patients lost their sense of smell after using 
 
158. Id. at 398–99, 400–01. 
159. Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 177 (4th Cir. 2009). 
160. Id. at 176–85. 
161. Id. at 188–92. 
162. Id. at 185. 
163. 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1313 (2011). 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 1323. 
166. Id. at 1324–25. 
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the drug.  Once the company learned that those doctors planned to 
present their findings, the company prevented the doctors from 
referencing the company’s drug in the presentation.167  Eventually, the 
FDA and Good Morning America alerted the public to the drug’s risk of 
loss of smell.168  After these warnings, the company issued a press 
release that stated that the drug was safe and that two double-blind 
studies found no link between loss of smell and use of the drug.169  
According to the Supreme Court, two facts made the inference of 
recklessness of intentional stock fraud at least as compelling as a 
nonculpable inference because they suggested a cover-up: first, the 
company prevented the doctor from referencing its drug.170  Second, the 
press release was misleading because, in fact, the company “had not 
conducted any studies relating to anosmia [(loss of smell)],” and the 
scientific evidence at the time was inconclusive.171   
As another example, in Berson v. Applied Signal Technology, Inc., 
the plaintiffs alleged that a telecommunications company lied to the 
public by counting government contracts as part of its backlog of 
scheduled work when, in reality, the government issued stop-work 
orders on those contracts.172  The company did not file for bankruptcy, 
there was no SEC investigation, and the company did not announce a 
restatement of its earnings.  The fact that justified a strong inference of 
scienter, according to the plaintiffs, was that the stop-work orders 
accounted for millions of dollars of work, the loss of which resulted in 
one of the company’s facilities becoming a ghost town.173  The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that it would have been absurd to suggest that the 
company’s executives were unaware of these stop-work orders because 
these contracts represented significant revenue for the company.174 
In Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., the plaintiffs alleged 
that a fiber-optic-cable manufacturer was touting demand for its product 
and the potential for a new product when, in fact, demand was slipping, 
the new product was still in development, and the new product wasn’t 
being received well by the market.175  Like Berson, the company did 
not file for bankruptcy, there was no SEC investigation, and the 
 
167. Id. at 1315. 
168. Id. at 1316. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 1324. 
171. Id. 
172. 527 F.3d 982, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2008). 
173. Id. at 988 n.5. 
174. Id. at 989. 
175. Tellabs II, 513 F.3d 702, 706 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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company did not announce a restatement of its earnings.  The plaintiffs 
instead alleged that the product was the company’s flagship product and 
twenty-six different confidential witnesses (each described with 
particularity) said that inside the company, they knew sales were 
dropping and the new product was not being received well.  The 
Seventh Circuit concluded that it was “exceedingly unlikely” that the 
defendants did not act with scienter.176  The court explained that the 
products at issue were the company’s “flagship product” and its 
“heralded successor,” like “Windows XP and Vista are to Microsoft.”177  
The idea that no member of the company’s senior management knew 
about the demand problems with these products, the court said, “is very 
hard to credit.”178 
 CONCLUSION 
My point is that the securities laws have transformed the motion to 
dismiss into something like summary judgment—the “put up or shut 
up” moment in a lawsuit.  This in turn means that plaintiffs are better 
situated when faced with a motion to dismiss if they have gathered 
sufficient, reliable evidence to corroborate allegations of fraud in the 
prefiling phase.  And dismissal statistics are bearing this fact out, 
finding that those complaints with corroborated allegations are more 
likely to survive dismissal.  But dismissal statistics and cases are telling 
in another respect as well.  They reveal that some forms of 
corroboration—SEC proceedings, accounting restatements, and 
bankruptcies—seem more likely to help stave off dismissal than 
others—insider trading, inferences from shared experience, and 
accounts from confidential witnesses. 
To close, notice that as important as the prefiling phase now is, many 
issues are still unexplored.  Namely, how can plaintiffs effectively and 
ethically gather evidence before filing a complaint?  How much of that 
evidence can plaintiffs get?  And then, how can plaintiffs present that 
evidence to the court in a manner that it generates a “cogent and 
compelling” inference that the facts alleged amount to a potential fraud 
and not mere negligence or indifference?  This Conference marks the 
beginning of the exploration of this phase. 
 
 
176. Id. at 709.  The confidential witnesses are described as “important sources for the 
allegations not only of falsity but also of scienter.”  Id. at 711. 
177. Id. at 709. 
178. Id. 
